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“You Have Shut Up the Jerries”
Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the
Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944
R. Daniel Pellerin

O

n 4 September 1944 British
troops, with the help of the
Belgian resistance, captured the port
of Antwerp intact. It was one of the
largest and most important ports
in Western Europe, but it lay at the
end of the Scheldt Estuary whose
50-kilometre length was controlled
by the Germans. It was essential that
the port be opened to shipping as
quickly as possible since the Allies
were facing a logistical crisis. Most
supplies still came over the original
D-Day beaches and had to be trucked
to the front, a distance of nearly 500
kilometres. The use of a large port
was critical to the success of future
operations.
From 13 September, while
the British prepared for a narrow
armoured and airborne thrust
through the Netherlands (Operation
Market Garden), First Canadian
Army’s task was to clear the Scheldt
Estuary. Operation Switchback was
the battle to capture the “Breskens
Pocket,” a virtual island bordered by
the Scheldt River, the Leopold Canal,
the Braakman Inlet, and the North
Sea. About 33 kilometres east to west
and 18 kilometres north to south, the
pocket was mostly below sea level.
The terrain was not conducive to
mobile warfare. The only high ground
was found southeast of Knocke, as
well as some sand dunes on the south
shore of the Scheldt. Worse, a German

Abstract: This paper examines
Canadian counter-battery work during
Operation Switchback, the battle
to clear the Breskens Pocket, from
6 October to 3 November 1944
during the Battle of the Scheldt. The
Canadians achieved some success
at isolating hostile batteries in the
pocket, but predicted shooting was
too inaccurate to permanently silence
them. In the planning stage, the
Canadians had little knowledge of the
Germans’ strength and dispositions
behind their defences north of the
Leopold Canal. Throughout the
battle, those involved in locating
hostile batteries strove to overcome
challenges posed by the weather
and terrain. Operational research
conducted after the battle revealed
that predicted fire dispersed shells
over an excessively large area, mostly
because of human error. Ultimately,
the evidence challenges the idea
that the Allies won the Second World
War by the “brute force” use of their
superior artillery and air assets rather
than through skill and ingenuity.

flooding programme presented
serious obstacles. In addition to an
inundated section in the west, a wide
flooded band in the south ran almost
to the Braakman, leaving only an
eight-kilometre stretch of traversable
land along the Leopold. The flooded
areas were under anywhere from
several inches to four or five feet
of water. The soil had turned to
mud, making the area impassable to
vehicles.1
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Histories of the battle have
usually offered a brief chronology of
events without providing much detail
into the Canadians’ preparations or
the battle’s aftermath. For decades,
the definitive account of Canadian
operations in Northwest Europe
has been C.P. Stacey’s official army
history The Victory Campaign. In his
treatment of the Scheldt battle, Stacey
emphasized strategic issues, and, in
particular, criticized Montgomery’s
failure to give the opening of Antwerp
sufficient attention. 2 Subsequent
studies of the Battle of the Scheldt
tended to focus on Operation
Infatuate, the capture of Walcheren
Island on the north shore of the
Scheldt Estuary. In the three decades
following the war, the historiography
of the clearing of the Breskens Pocket
hardly went beyond Stacey’s official
history.3
Stacey credited the Canadians’
victory, at least in part, to their
generous artillery support and
the infantry’s ability to call in
concentrations of fire quickly and
readily. 4 This view is consistent
with John Ellis’ observation in his
book Brute Force that the Allies had
an overwhelming advantage over
Germany and Japan in economic
capacity, which translated into
numerical superiority in artillery,
armour, aircraft and ships. Yet
according to Ellis, instead of using
17
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This air photo was taken on 6 October 1944, the first day of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade
attack across the Leopold Canal. It shows the sector assaulted by the Royal Montreal Regiment
and the Regina Rifles. The effects of Canadian defensive artillery fire is evident, especially in Eede.
The flooded ground north of the canal which affected movement is also visible. Laurier Centre for
Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 196/3047 & 3049
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these assets to achieve a quick and
decisive victory, commanders of
the Western Allies, anxious to avoid
heavy loss of life, “seemed unable to
impose their will upon the enemy
except by slowly and persistently
battering him to death with a blunt
instrument.”5 This “brute force” thesis
was largely based on generalizations
and oversimplifications, not a
detailed analysis of operational
documents. Stacey’s contention that
the Canadians owed their victory at
the Scheldt to the infantry’s ability
to request immediate artillery fire on
prearranged targets was not seriously
contested until the appearance of Terry
Copp’s Montgomery’s Scientists. This
edited collection, which reproduced a
series of operational research reports
written during the war, showed that
Canadian shells were dispersed over
large areas, which indicated that
18 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
Published

predicted artillery fire was not nearly
as accurate as previously thought.6
This article examines the
application of predicted fire
techniques – counter-battery (CB)
work – during Operation Switchback.
It builds on Copp’s books and
challenges Ellis’ thesis in Brute Force.
The clearing of the Breskens Pocket
was not a return to the voluminous
barrages of the First World War.
Switchback was an example of the
Allies’ use of artillery in a precise and
economical fashion. The artillery plan
for the operation was not designed
to blanket the enemy with fire, but
to engage specific targets when
needed. The Allies’ employment
of sophisticated CB techniques,
and the creation of an efficient
communications system necessary
for these techniques, suggests
that artillery in Switchback was

anything but a “blunt instrument.”
The methods used to identify and
locate hostile batteries were effective,
as long as atmospheric conditions
and the terrain cooperated. That was
very rarely the case during the battle.
While the Canadians were mostly
successful in identifying and locating
hostile batteries in the Breskens
Pocket, predicted fire was seldom
accurate enough to permanently
destroy them. Nevertheless, the
fire was close enough that it often
suppressed the enemy batteries
during crucial periods in the battle.

The Plan for
Operation Switchback

T

he plan for Operation Switchback
made CB work difficult.
While the plan was ambitious,
imaginative and allowed for large3

Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3
October, Brigadier J.G. Spragge’s 7th
Canadian Infantry Brigade would
attack a dry section of the German
defensive line north of Leopold Canal
where it diverged from the Canal de
Dérivation de la Lys. The 7th Brigade
would be followed later by Brigadier
K.G. Blackader’s 8th Canadian
Infantry Brigade. The second phase
of the plan called for Brigadier J.M.
Rockingham’s 9th Canadian Infantry
Brigade to cross the Braakman in
amphibious Landing Vehicles,
Tracked (LVTs, or “Buffaloes”), and
land in a relatively undefended area
near Hoofdplaat on 8 October. This
would force the Germans to fight on
two fronts and cut their escape routes
at Breskens and Hoofdplaat. Once
the two bridgeheads were linked, the
Canadians would advance westward
to the coastal town of Knocke to clear
the rest of the pocket.8
For a one-division operation,
the plan for Operation Switchback
provided very generous artillery
support. The artillery formations
allotted to the operation included
2nd Canadian Army Group, Royal
Artillery (AGRA) (two heavy and
four medium regiments) on the left
and 9th British AGRA (one super
heavy, two heavy, and four medium
regiments) on the right, plus the field
artillery from 3rd and 4th Canadian
Divisions. Throughout the operation,
the medium regiments, totalling 128
guns, would conduct most of the
CB fire while the field regiments

scale artillery support, intelligence
greatly underestimated the German
strength in the Breskens Pocket,
and the terrain offered little hope
of gathering further intelligence
through observation. Because the plan
demanded surprise, it eliminated any
preliminary counter-bombardment.
With limited knowledge of the
German gun positions, the Canadian
counter-battery staff and associated
units faced a challenging task.
Directing the battle was
Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds,
who was temporarily in command
of First Canadian Army while
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar
was in the United Kingdom
undergoing medical treatment.
In the meantime, Major-General
Charles Foulkes took Simonds’ place
commanding II Canadian Corps. On
2 October Foulkes filed his outline
for Operation Switchback, which was
largely based on an earlier version
devised by Simonds.7 The objective
was twofold: to capture the Breskens
Pocket and clear the German coast
artillery dominating the Scheldt,
and to provide suitable areas for
Allied artillery positions to support
follow-on operations against the
strongly-held Walcheren Island. The
task of clearing the pocket fell to 3rd
Canadian Infantry Division under
Major-General D.C. Spry.
The innovative operation used
two spearheads to take advantage
of German weaknesses. First, on 6

would provide direct support of the
attacking infantry.9
The element of surprise was
critical for the success of Operation
Switchback. Simonds’ plan called for
a “silent” policy for the days before the
attack; there was to be no preliminary
CB fire or even any registration
shoots. 10 The only bombardment
allowed prior to the attack was from
4th Division’s field guns, which
were to continue harassing fire to
the east of 7th Brigade’s crossing
point as a diversion until H-Hour,
set for 0530 hours on 6 October. A
one-hour bombardment was to begin
at H minus 120 minutes. From H
minus 55 to H minus 25 minutes, a
short CB programme would engage
fixed batteries. Finally, another
bombardment programme would
run until H plus 150 minutes, after
which the infantry would call in
fire as needed. At H-Hour, the CB
policy would be “active” – as soon
as a hostile battery opened fire, it was
to be engaged immediately. For the
whole day, the counter-battery officer
(CBO) had priority call on all heavy
guns and two medium regiments.
Twenty rounds per field gun, 50 per
medium gun, and 50 per heavy gun
were allocated to CB tasks.11
Because there would be no
preliminary bombardment aside
from the timed programme, it was
imperative to use observation to
locate enemy artillery, mortars and
machine guns. The 4th Division was

Anglo-Canadian Artillery Assets, Operation Switchback, 6 October 1944
Formation

Field Guns
25-pdr

3 Cdn Inf Div

72

4 Cdn Armd Div

72

Medium Guns
4.5-inch

Heavy Guns
7.2-inch

155mm

Super Heavy Guns
8-inch

240 mm

Total
72
72

2 Cdn AGRA

16

48
64

16

12

1

2

95

16

112

32

20

1

2

327

9 AGRA
Total

5.5-inch

144

16

8

88

Source: WD, HQ 2 Cdn AGRA, October 1944: app. 1, RCA 2 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 8, 5 October 1944, p.1.
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A 5.5-inch gun of the Royal Canadian Artillery in action south of Vaucelles, France, 23 July 1944. This
medium gun was the standard artillery piece used for counter-battery fire during Operation Switchback.

Counter-Battery
Work in 1944

T

he 2nd Counter Battery Officer’s
Staff was vital in the priority task
of engaging hostile batteries. The CB
staff sought to provide information
about the location, strength, arcs
of fire and behaviour of the enemy
artillery and to use that information
to silence, or at least suppress, hostile
batteries.14 Some of the techniques to
emerge from the First World War for
locating hostile batteries continued to
be used during the Second, including
flash spotting, air observation, sound
ranging, espionage, and intelligence
from locals and prisoners.15
The British had adjusted
artillery organization and field
communications early in the Second
20 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
Published

World War to apply scientific methods
in identifying and locating enemy
batteries. The CBO was attached to
corps headquarters and responsible to
the commander, corps Royal Artillery
(CCRA). His role was to compile and
disseminate intelligence summaries
of hostile batteries to divisional
headquarters and artillery units. The
CBO was not a commander, but an
adviser to the CCRA on CB policy
and communications requirements.16
During Switchback, the CBO of II
Canadian Corps was LieutenantColonel J.H.D. Ross. He had his
own staff of about 30 men, including
staff officers and their clerks, and
a number of batmen, drivers and
orderlies.17 Acting CBOs (ACBOs),
usually captains, were assigned to
each division and were responsible
for the technical work, such as
analyzing shell craters and shell
fragments, examining photographs,
ordering bombardments for
divisional frontages, and contributing
material for intelligence summaries
and hostile battery lists. A special
ACBO (Air) was responsible for

liaison with the Army Photographic
Interpretation Section and assisted
the Air Liaison Officer in briefing
pilots for artillery reconnaissance.18
CB intelligence summaries contained
a review of CB operations and newly
identified hostile batteries. These
were normally filed and distributed
at least weekly,19 but Ross and his
staff did so almost daily during active
operations. These summaries are
essential for understanding CB work
during the Battle of the Scheldt.
The bulk of CB intelligence came
from the corps’ survey regiment, in
this case 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA.
It consisted of two batteries, each
composed of an observation troop for
flash spotting, a sound ranging troop,
and a survey troop. This structure
was well-suited to work under corps
or to be assigned temporarily to
divisions.20
The British and Canadians
entrusted much of their CB work
to sound ranging. The purpose of
sound ranging was to locate hostile
batteries where visual methods could
not by tracing the sound made by

Library and Archives Canada PA 130062

tasked with establishing observation
posts along the whole Leopold front.12
Nos.660 and 661 Air Observation Post
(AOP) squadrons, Royal Air Force
(RAF) were available for observation,
with individual flights assigned to
specified zones of responsibility.13

5
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a firing gun or an exploding shell.
The technique took advantage of
the relatively slow speed of sound,
1107.6 feet per second in still air at
50 degrees Fahrenheit and 50 percent
relative humidity. Recorders could
measure to within 1/300 of a second,
during which sound travels just over
a metre. 21 The principle on which
sound ranging rested assumed that if
sound travels at the same velocity in
all directions, it will travel at the same
speed between its source and any two
points that are equidistant from it
(i.e. if the source is actually midway
between the two points). But if the
source – the firing gun – happened to
be closer to one point, then the sound
would reach it sooner than the other
point. Thus, using microphones at a
set distance apart, surveyors could
determine the location of the enemy
gun by calculating the discrepancy
between the times at which the
same sound reached two different
points. In 1944, surveyors used five
or six microphones spaced 1,000
or 2,000 metres apart in a straight
line or a concave curve in front of
enemy territory to create the sound
ranging base.22 This technique was
the most common method used in
the Breskens Pocket to identify active
German batteries.
Of course, sound ranging was
never straightforward because
atmospheric conditions greatly affect
the transmission of sound waves.
While humidity has little influence on

sound, temperature does: for every
degree Fahrenheit above 50, sound
travels one foot per second faster,
and the opposite for every degree
below 50. More importantly, wind
has a significant effect on the speed
of sound, as sound waves travel faster
downwind of the source. Moreover,
when the wind travels faster along
the ground than it does higher in the
atmosphere, it tends to direct sound
upwards, making sound increasingly
inaudible on the ground as it travels
away from its source.23 Terrain is also
important as audibility can be poor
in valleys. Heavy bombardments
made it difficult to isolate discharges
from particular batteries.24 In ideal
conditions, the probable error in
locating a hostile battery at a range
of 1,000 yards by sound ranging
alone was at least 100 yards with 1944
methods.25

Nevertheless, sound ranging
had several advantages over other
CB techniques. It was quick and
could provide more information on
the type of hostile battery than any
other survey method. It required
only a single shot to identify and
locate a hostile battery, and it had
a particular advantage over visual
methods such as flash spotting
whose effectiveness was limited by
modern flashless propellants and
concealment measures.26
The lack of natural observation
points produced by the flat terrain of
western Belgium and the Netherlands
certainly favoured the defence
and made CB work for Switchback
challenging. Until a tall structure
could be captured, the Canadians

A 5.5-inch gun firing in support of the Canadians.
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A German pillbox mounting a 105 mm gun in an armoured turret. This position was not destroyed by counter-battery fire and
remained in action until captured by the Canadian Scottish and North Nova Scotia Highlanders near the end of the battle.

had no “vantage points from which
artillery officers could observe and
direct the fire of the guns.” 27 A
further problem was that the German
batteries had been rather inactive in
late September when 4th Division had
held the area south of the Leopold
Canal, and few hostile batteries had
been identified and located before
3rd Division’s arrival.28 By 5 October,
2nd Survey Regiment managed to
establish two sound ranging and two
flash spotting observation posts, the
latter upon towers built by engineers.
This preliminary CB work achieved
some immediate results: on 5 October
alone, the Canadians identified 29
active hostile batteries. All but three,
however, were “unfixed,” which
meant that their positions were not
known with sufficient accuracy
to warrant bombardment without
further investigation.29 The CB staff
and the survey regiment would have

22 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
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to work quickly to fix the rest of the
German batteries as soon as possible
during the early days of the battle.

German Dispositions
in the Breskens Pocket

A

lthough the Canadians had
a clear idea of the German
defences and the nature of the terrain
immediately across the Leopold
Canal, the plan for Switchback
suffered from insufficient knowledge
of enemy strength and dispositions in
the pocket. In September, intelligence
predicted and then confirmed that
the Germans might take advantage
of the Canadians’ inability to use
tanks in the area by holding the south
bank of the West Scheldt for as long
as possible. They had no intention
of falling back from the Leopold,
determined to keep their own guns

on the south bank of the West Scheldt
to hold the approaches to Antwerp.30
By about 20 September 1944,
100,000 men of the German Fifteenth
Army and thousands of vehicles and
artillery pieces had been evacuated
across the West Scheldt, leaving 64th
Infantry Division and some attached
units to defend “Scheldt Fortress
South.”31 While Allied intelligence
of 64th Division’s forward positions
was very good, there was no reliable
information on its reserves or its
total strength in men or equipment.
According to Copp, Ultra (intelligence
derived from decrypted German
signals) “provided little assistance
when it came to questions of enemy
strengths and dispositions, so much
depended on photo reconnaissance
and patrol reports.”32 On 5 October,
the day before the attack, II Canadian
Corps’ counter-battery staff had
catalogued some 68 medium and

7
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heavy artillery pieces in the pocket.33
Very little was known of the Germans’
coastal artillery positions, and in any
case most of the German artillery
was thought to be in the second line
of defence just behind the Leopold.34
The garrison’s strength in men was
estimated at no higher than 7,000
men, only 2,000 of which were
thought to be infantry. “There have
been no indications that the enemy
has undisclosed reserves of any
considerable strength in layback
positions behind his present line,”
according to an intelligence summary
from 7 October.35 The 64th Division
was comprised of the 1037th, 1038th
and 1039th Grenadier Regiments.
In the days preceding the attack,
intelligence placed 1039th Regiment
on the enemy’s left flank, 1038th in
the centre of the line, and 1037th
furthest to the west. The central and
eastern sectors of 64th Division’s
front were believed to be reinforced
with 500 men of 129th Anti-Aircraft
Regiment, equipped with 88 mm
guns.36
The German position in the
Breskens Pocket was stronger than
the Allies realized. Generalmajor
Knut Eberding’s 64th Division
had been selected to hold Scheldt
Fortress South because, of all the
divisions in Fifteenth Army, it was
the strongest in equipment and
skilled men, especially compared
to those divisions that had seen
action in Normandy. It had a full
complement of artillery, including
203rd Naval Coast Artillery Battalion
and elements of the 204th, as well as
ample ammunition and supplies.37
On Walcheren, in positions that
could fire into the Breskens Pocket,
was the 810th Naval Anti-Aircraft
Battalion at Flushing and, elsewhere
on the island, the 202nd Naval
Coast Artillery Battalion. Historical
narratives written during and shortly
after the war placed the German
strength in the pocket on 6 October
1944 as high as 15,000 men.38 From

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3

German Artillery Assets, Operation Switchback,
30 September 1944
Weapon Type
Mortar

Antiaircraft

Antitank

Gun

Howitzer

Calibre

Quantity

8.1 cm

38

12 cm

1

20 mm

8

Quadruple 20 mm

8

French 25 mm

6

37 mm

15

Twin 37 mm

3

40 mm

2

88 mm

23

3.7 cm

9

5.7 cm

6

7.5 cm

31

Czech 83.5 mm

5

15 cm

1

Czech 80 mm

1

10.5 cm

20

15 cm

21

Soviet
(calibre unknown)

6

Total

Total
39

65

13

37

48

202

Source: A.G. Steiger, AHQ Report No.69, 30 July 1954, par. 205 and note.

German sources, the actual number
of German troops left in the Breskens
Pocket was about 11,000 following
the exodus of most of Fifteenth
Army across the Scheldt. Excluding
anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the
garrison had anywhere from 65 to 73
guns of 75 mm or larger.39 This was a
substantially stronger force than the
Canadians estimated.

The Attack

A

rtillery activity during the
battle can be divided into three
distinct phases. The first, from 6 to
14 October, saw extremely heavy
bombardment from both sides while
the Canadian infantry made little
progress. During the period from
15 to 20 October, the slow infantry
progress continued but the German
guns were very quiet. This limited the
CB work that could contribute to the
Canadian advance. CB intelligence

gathering, particularly by visual
techniques, was again compromised
by poor weather in the last stage
of the battle, from 21 October to 3
November.
During the first days of Operation
Switchback the Canadian infantry
struggled to establish a bridgehead
on the north side of the Leopold
Canal. The fire plan opened at 0330
hours on 6 October, two hours before
the infantry assault. The programme
went according to plan, except
at about 0420 hours when heavy
German shells hit the headquarters of
13th Field Regiment near Zeebrugge,
“which provided an early reveille
for many people and turned one
vehicle into a reasonable replica of a
sieve.”40 Such occurrences were quite
rare throughout the operation; the
Germans never mounted concerted
CB efforts and preferred instead
to shell the infantry bridgeheads.
Canadian artillery units seldom

23
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had come from Sluis to reinforce
1038th Grenadier Regiment’s sector.43
As the morning progressed, there
was also much more German shelling
than expected. The war diarist of
23rd Field Regiment (Self-Propelled),
RCA wrote, “apparently the Germans
have a lot more stuff over there than
we had thought. He has concealed
his strength very cleverly.”44 It was
already becoming apparent that the
Canadians had underestimated the
German defences.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ross
considered the pre-zero hour CB
programme a success because the
German guns had remained quiet for
the early morning. However, he made
it clear in his intelligence summary
for 6 October that determining the
effectiveness of CB fire during an
operation was almost impossible;
most of the hostile batteries identified

had just been holes in the ground
from which German guns fired.
Limited visibility meant that the AOP
squadrons could identify only some
of the enemy’s gun positions. Hence,
by the afternoon, German guns were
able to fire on the attacking infantry
with impunity. At the very least,
with so much enemy shelling, the
CB staff had more information with
which to locate German batteries: on
the first day of the operation, twelve
new batteries were fixed, mostly by
AOP, and five additional batteries
were identified by sound ranging.45
The Canadians held onto their
tenuous bridgeheads in the face of
continued strong resistance. On 7
October, most of the enemy shelling
came from field and medium guns
located close to the Germans’ forward
defences at the Leopold. That day the
CB staff identified 17 hostile batteries

Shells land in Breskens, 22 October 1944.
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reported enemy shells landing in
their lines. During the short CB
programme before the attack, the
Allies engaged 29 fixed batteries at a
ratio of 14 guns per hostile battery.41
At 0530 hours, the infantry of
Spragge’s 7th Canadian Infantry
Brigade attacked across the Leopold
supported by flame-throwing
“Wasp” armoured vehicles. On the
right, 1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish
Regiment secured a small bridgehead
at Oosthoek and Moershoofd, while
the Regina Rifle Regiment (with
the Royal Montreal Regiment
replacing its “B” Company on the
left) struggled to establish a foothold
across from Moerhuizen.42 Resistance
was stiff: there were simply more
troops opposite the canal than
expected, including substantial
reserves. A company of 1st Parachute
Replacement and Training Regiment

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3
by sound ranging, and another six
by flash spotting. All batteries that
had been fixed were engaged as soon
as they fired, and sometimes the
Canadians tried to engage an unfixed
battery “for lack of a better target.”
The 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA and
3rd Super Heavy Regiment, RA each
engaged one battery near Cadzand
to the west and were reportedly
successful.46 The next day, 8 October,
saw only light, but continuous, enemy
shelling. Thus far, artillery support
seemed to be effective. Headquarters,
2nd Canadian AGRA commended
4th Medium Regiment, RCA in a
message stating that the “Infantry
is well pleased with Harassing Fire
– very good. You have shut up the
Jerries. The Infantry can rest a bit
now.”47 The message was premature,
however, as enemy fire intensified
in the evening. The survey regiment
identified 13 active German batteries
on 8 October, the majority by sound
ranging. Much of the enemy fire
came from the Cadzand area. 48
That evening, from its position at
Maldegem, 3rd Medium Regiment
engaged a battery of four 9‑inch guns
on the south shore of the Scheldt
from 2030 hours to midnight.49 The
7th Medium Regiment, RCA also
engaged and silenced two hostile
batteries using air observation, but
was then ordered to proceed north of
Antwerp the next day to support 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division.50
The pressure on the 7th Brigade
bridgeheads was supposed to have
been eased by 9th Brigade’s assault
from Terneuzen scheduled to begin
at 0130 hours on 8 October, but at
the last minute that attack had to
be delayed by 24 hours. The 9th
Brigade troops were transported
in LVTs, and approached, out of
sight of the enemy, in the Ghent–
Terneuzen Canal. The vehicles
could not climb up at the damaged
locks at Terneuzen, however, and
engineers had to construct ramps.51
The men on the Leopold front had

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3

to withstand the full force of German
counterattacks for another day. In
the early hours of 9 October, with no
preliminary counter-bombardment,
the North Nova Scotia Highlanders
landed at Green Beach east of
Hoofdplaat and the Highland Light
Infantry of Canada landed at Amber
Beach immediately to the south. The
infantry met no German resistance.
The reserve battalion, the Stormont,
Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders,
landed later in the morning. Ross sent
a detachment along with the brigade
to coordinate CB work on the new
front. By 0900 hours, the Canadians
had created a bridgehead some
1,500 yards deep pushing westward
beyond the main dykes. Alarmed,
the Germans responded with intense
artillery fire from the heavy guns at
Breskens and Flushing, “a visitation
which made movement by our
vehicles a somewhat precarious
duty.”52
On the morning of 9 October,
while Rockingham’s 9th Brigade was
busy consolidating its bridgehead
near Hoofdplaat, Ross met with
Brigadier E.R. Suttie (Commander,
2nd Canadian AGRA), both of whom
were headquartered at Eelvelde,
near Maldegem. Ross needed to
discuss some problems with counterbombardment. Enemy artillery
activity on the Leopold had increased
dramatically overnight, and the
Canadian countermeasures were
not having much effect. Only 25
rounds had been allotted to medium
and heavy guns per day for CB
tasks, which was only enough to
engage hostile batteries known
to be active and not enough to
destroy them outright or to suppress
positions that were only suspect.
Suttie discussed the matter with
Brigadier A.B. Matthews (CCRA, II
Canadian Corps), also at Eelvelde,
and later that morning Ross received
word that the ammunition allotment
to CB tasks had been increased to 50

and 35 rounds for medium and heavy
guns per day, respectively.53
Even though the Canadians
increased their ammunition
expenditure, it was becoming clear by
the 10th that their countermeasures
were frustratingly ineffective.
Ross noted that the Canadians had
achieved at least some success the
day before as the German forward
batteries either were temporarily
silenced or were never heard from
again. 54 But the Germans had
already begun to bring their reserves
forward, as three companies of
1st Parachute Replacement and
Training Regiment had relieved
1038th Grenadier Regiment by the
previous night. 55 More German
batteries were active than ever.
Furthermore, the coastal batteries,
including two batteries at Cadzand
that were causing the most trouble,
could not be engaged as effectively
because the 5.5- and 4.5‑inch gunhowitzers had maximum ranges
of about 15,840 and 19,360 yards,
respectively. The greater the distance
from the target, the more diffuse the
Canadian concentrations became.
The Canadian weapons were no
match for the German 150 mm coastal
guns firing from Walcheren, which
could hurl shells some 24,000 to
26,800 yards.56 Thus there was very
little the Canadians could do about
the coastal batteries until the front
line moved forward.
From 10 October, the Germans
shifted their artillery efforts to
repelling 9th Brigade’s assault, which
gave 7th Brigade some respite. The
incessant German counterattacks
on the Braakman front translated
into constant requests for defensive
fire, which helped to halt attacks.
However, batteries around Breskens
and Flushing relentlessly pummelled
9th Brigade. The Canadians were very
busy with CB fire throughout the day,
firing 33 predicted concentrations,
some at a ratio of 20 guns per target.
The several attempts throughout
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the day at silencing hostile battery
YT near Breskens were unsuccessful
because the medium guns southwest
of Terneuzen were firing at near their
maximum range.57 As 7th Brigade
continued to fight forward from
the Leopold Canal, Major-General
Spry decided to reinforce success by
reassigning 8th Brigade, which was
originally supposed to assist with the
Leopold attack, to bolster 9th Brigade.
The bulk of the Canadian artillery
assets involved in Switchback were
also transferred to the northeast.58
German artillery on the Leopold
front remained “virtually silent” on
the 11th, while the German coastal
batteries continued to shell the
Braakman front.59
The fighting on 9th Brigade’s
front became increasingly vicious.
Brigadier Rockingham remarked on
12 October that the German artillery
was very effective, against which
the Canadians had little protection
in the flat polder country.60 By this
time, it was clear to the Canadians
that the fighting in the Breskens
Pocket was as intense as that during
the early days of the Normandy
Campaign. German activity,
especially shelling and mortaring,
was reduced along the Leopold, as
only about 100 enemy shells were
reported to land in that bridgehead
on the 12th, much less than during
the first days of the battle. But the
Braakman bridgehead experienced
no less than 12 counterattacks
from 11 to 12 October as well as
intense artillery bombardment from
positions near Breskens, Cadzand,
Flushing and South Beveland. 61
The 12th was a day of very intense
counter-bombardment, with 52 CB
shoots. The 3rd Medium Regiment
fired an impressive 20 CB and 22
harassing fire tasks, at 99 rounds
per gun. On the same day the RAF
conducted a major bombing mission,
with the heavy bombers attacking
Breskens and medium bombers
attacking Cadzand. 62 Given the
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increased German attention to the
Braakman bridgehead, 9th Brigade
had succeeded in taking pressure
from 7th Brigade.
The first week of Operation
Switchback had seen important
setbacks and unpleasant surprises.
Progress on the Leopold bridgehead
was slower than planners had
anticipated, but 9th Brigade’s
landing, even though a day late, was
a great success.
During the second week, shelling
from both sides steadily declined
because of limited visibility in the
autumn weather. Consequently, CB
work and counter-bombardment
were less intensive than before.
Some progress was finally made
on the Leopold front, as engineers
finished constructing bridges at
Strooibrug for tanks.63 Intelligence at
last acknowledged that the Germans
had many more troops in the Breskens
Pocket than it had first estimated. The
Canadians had only been in contact
with the forward troops of Eberding’s
64th Infantry Division in that sector of
the front before the operation, which
obscured the division’s reserves.
Intelligence confirmed from 12 to 13
October that the entire 3rd Battalion,
1st Parachute Replacement and
Training Regiment and Battlegroup
Krause were in the pocket.64 Overall,
the 13th was a bad day for CB work.
The skies were clear enough for
fighter-bombers to attack German
guns and two houses that were
believed to be ammunition dumps
in front of the Queen’s Own Rifles of
Canada.65 But the cool temperature
and wind made it difficult to identify
active hostile batteries with sound
ranging. The infantry called only for
moderate artillery support, a total of
14 predicted shoots for the day.66
By 14 October, the Canadians
fighting north of the Leopold against
the ferocious German defence had
managed to secure a foothold in the
southern edge of Eede, a kilometre

from where they had crossed. The
bridgehead was large enough for
3rd Division to move its remaining
field artillery on that front to new
gun areas on the opposite side of
the canal. 67 The two bridgeheads
became linked, and the entire eastern
portion of the pocket was in Canadian
hands. 68 After severe losses, most
German units were down to a third of
their original strength; they had also
started to withdraw forces from 4th
Division’s front to the east. As far as
artillery was concerned, intelligence
estimated that the Germans still had
50 field, 30 medium, seven heavy and
30 heavy anti-aircraft guns, as well as
35 other unidentified artillery pieces
for a total of 152 guns of all types
in the Breskens Pocket. This was
the largest number of German guns
holding the approaches to Antwerp,
but there were formidable artillery
forces in the adjacent areas as well,
76 artillery pieces on Walcheren and
55 in South Beveland.69
The strong, concrete-protected
coastal artillery positions at Breskens
and the Flushing batteries were
notorious for shelling the Canadians,
especially on 9th Brigade’s line of
advance along the south shore of
the West Scheldt. The AOP aircraft
patrolled the area regularly, which
made the German firing stop for a
short time, but did nothing to damage
the guns or inflict casualties on the
crews.70 Photographs of Breskens and
Flushing, which had been heavily
bombed by the RAF over the previous
days, suggested that at least half of
the batteries were destroyed. Three
positions at Flushing had also been
demolished. CB work suggested
that the Germans had redeployed
their guns, as most of the firing
over the previous two days had
come from positions that had not
previously been located whereas
known positions had been silent for
some time.71 The Canadians’ newly
consolidated major bridgehead and
the Germans’ reallocation of their
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A 25-pounder gun and crew in the Scheldt, October 1944.

guns meant that the battle was
entering a new phase.

A Brief Respite

T

he period from 15 to 20 October,
following an initial period of
intense bombardment from both
sides, was relatively quiet for the
artillery. German shelling was so
light and visibility was so poor on
the 15th that Ross’ staff received
very little information from 2nd
Survey Regiment on active hostile
batteries. Even the coastal batteries
fired infrequently on 16 October, and
the Canadians therefore conducted
very few counter-bombardments.72
An intelligence summary from
II Canadian Corps noted on 7th
Brigade’s frontage that while German
muzzle flashes were visible on 16
October, sometimes no shells landed
in Canadian lines. Brigadier N.E.
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Rodger (Chief of Staff, II Canadian
Corps) believed this to be an attempt
to confuse the Canadian flash
spotters.73 That the Germans made
the effort to mount such a deceptive
tactic suggests that Canadian CB
work had made a difference.
On the morning of the 17th,
although the German coastal
batteries continued to fire, artillery
and mortar fire inside the Breskens
Pocket “slackened off.” The
Canadians conducted only ten CB
shoots throughout the day, most of
which were coordinated by the AOP
squadrons.74 On 18 October, while
the guns at Flushing continued to
harass 9th Brigade, German shelling
was at its lowest level since the
commencement of Switchback. More
important, 2nd Survey Regiment’s
“A” Troop was finally able to
establish a flash spotting base to
observe Flushing and pinpoint the

locations of the German batteries
there.75
Meanwhile, the infantry had
made such impressive gains pushing
the Germans westward that 9th
AGRA could move its guns across
the Leopold. 76 On the 19th, the
bad weather made AOP shoots
impossible, and predicted shoots
engaged only four hostile batteries.77
At midnight on 19/20 October,
the Germans withdrew to the line
Breskens–Schoondijke–Oostburg–
Sluis, a semicircle that curved to the
North Sea. Behind it were all the guns
they could move.78
On 20 October, Spry contrived
a plan to break the new German
line. He ordered the 7th Brigade,
which had just been relieved by the
British 157th Infantry Brigade, to pass
through 9th Brigade and clear the
enemy northeast of Cadzand. At the
same time, 8th Brigade was to take
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Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Crofton of the Canadian Scottish Regiment examines the wreckage of a German
155 mm gun near Breskens, 28 October 1944. German beach defences are visible in the background.

Oostburg, Sluis and Cadzand, then
clear what remained of the pocket
between the Leopold and the coast.79
The coastal batteries only lightly
shelled the Canadians. Intelligence
from a reliable source reported that
the Germans manned their guns at
0500 hours daily. To take advantage
of this opportunity to eliminate some
crews while they were still in the open,
a counter-bombardment programme
fired against five hostile batteries, in
addition to three predicted shoots.80

Endgame
21 October–3 November

I

n the last period of the battle,
between 21 October and 3
November, artillery activity in the
Breskens Pocket escalated as the
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infantry captured more and more
ground, but the late October weather
soon began to impede CB work
and air support. After the lengthy
period of minimal German artillery
activity, operations became more
intense on 21 October as the German
situation in the Breskens Pocket
became desperate. On that day,
9th Brigade launched attacks on
Breskens and Schoondijke. 81 The
attack toward Breskens was met
with heavy shelling, primarily from
Flushing. But coordinating CB fire
was difficult because the movement
of so many Allied guns to new
positions closer to the front presented
communications problems. Enemy
artillery, especially from the Flushing
batteries, was heavy. However,
Allied air support was also very

active. Heavy and medium bombers
retaliated against Flushing and
Cadzand, respectively, and hostile
battery ZQ in Breskens was attacked
from the air five times. Despite its
volume, the aerial bombardment
had mixed results, as batteries in
those cities were still identified
as active afterward. 82 There was
only light shelling overnight until
Batteries Flushing North, Flushing
West, Flushing East and Dishoek on
Walcheren opened fire on Canadian
forces south of Breskens the next
morning and again in the afternoon.
Shells landed in the lines of 8th and
9th Brigades. The Germans also still
had active artillery in Cadzand,
which was difficult to locate with any
certainty because of poor visibility
in the miserable weather and the
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dearth of observation points in
the unrelievedly flat country. The
weather made AOP useless for several
days, so counter-bombardment was
limited to predicted fire from 22 to
25 October.83
Bad visibility continued into
the 26th, though there was much
more shelling than in previous days,
especially at Schoondijke. On the
left, after slow progress, 8th Brigade
captured Oostburg. 84 The men of
Battery Nieuwe Sluis evacuated
their gun positions and thereafter
fought as infantry. 85 Counterbombardment was again limited to
18 predicted shoots.86 The weather
slightly improved the next day, 27
October, which allowed for sound
ranging to identify five new unfixed
batteries. However, 202nd Naval
Coast Artillery Battalion’s batteries
at Domburg, Zouteland and Dishoek
on Walcheren were too distant to be
located accurately.87
The German shelling on the 28th
was the heaviest it had been for a long
time. The Canadians concluded that
the Germans had been conserving
their ammunition until they realized
that there was nothing to be gained
by hoarding it any longer. 88 The
last German artillery unit left in the
pocket, 203rd Naval Coast Artillery
Battalion, fought on at Cadzand with
two 150 mm howitzers and a troop of
gunners converted to infantry.89 The
next day, its commander reported
dwindling supplies of 150 mm rounds
and that his unit was down to nine
officers and 243 other ranks. Though
the situation was hopeless, the
battalion was promised a shipment
of ammunition that night and was
told that “the bridgehead was to
be defended to the last cartridge.”90
As far as Ross was concerned, CB
work for Operation Switchback was
practically complete since most of
the known German batteries in the
Breskens Pocket had been overrun.
Ross’ attention shifted to softening
German positions on Walcheren in
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preparation for the impending attack.
Ten of the remaining batteries were
attacked by heavy bombers and
fighter-bombers, but with limited
success as some of them survived
and were still active later in the day.91
At 1800 hours on 31 October,
the Germans’ 203rd Naval Coast
Artillery Battalion reported that its
strength was down to six officers and
86 other ranks. It had no operational
guns left.92 The job was almost over
and 3rd Division no longer needed
the immense artillery support it had
been allotted at the beginning of
the operation. The attention of First
Canadian Army, and indeed much
of 21st Army Group, was on the new
task at hand: the capture of Walcheren
Island (Operation Infatuate). The
week before, 9th AGRA had been
moved to support 52nd (Lowland)
and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions
on South Beveland.93 On 31 October,
2nd Canadian AGRA and 61st and
110th Field Regiments, RA were
reallocated to coastal positions
to support Infatuate, leaving 3rd
Division with only its own field
artillery.94 From 1 November, while
the Canadian artillery moved into its
new positions to support the assault
on Walcheren, the infantry mopped
up the remainder of the pocket.
Knokke, Heist-aan-Zee and Sluis
were all cleared. On 3 November, with
no German strongpoints remaining
in the Breskens Pocket, Operation
Switchback was complete.95
The clearing of the Breskens
Pocket had been a dreadful experience
for all of the forces involved. The duel
between Allied and German artillery
had been intense. While the German
guns were set on obliterating the
attacking Canadian infantry, the
Canadian guns aimed to suppress
and silence its opposite numbers. In
the end, it was a decisive victory for
the Allies and a source of pride for the
Canadians. CB work was an integral
part of that victory, but the efforts
of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross and 2nd

Survey Regiment were at the mercy of
the unfavourable weather. After the
first week of Switchback, identifying
and accurately locating hostile
batteries was difficult. Clouds and
rain hindered air support and wind
interfered with sound. Fortunately,
the periods during which CB work
was least productive were also those
in which the German artillery was
least active. In other words, CB work
was effective when it was needed
the most.

Aftermath and Analysis

T

he clearing of the Breskens Pocket
provided important lessons
regarding CB fire. The large volume
of shells devoted to CB tasks made
it seem that counter-bombardment
during Operation Switchback was
overwhelmingly effective. However,
operational research revealed that
hostile batteries were only being
temporarily silenced. The experience
of clearing the Breskens Pocket made
it clear that while the Canadians may
have been adept at locating hostile
batteries, counter-bombardment
through predicted shooting was
much less accurate than expected.
How effective had CB methods
been? A study conducted by 3rd
Division after the battle stated
that “difficulties of operation of
Flash Spotting and Sound Ranging
in polder country” made CB
information “unreliable,” though
the final report did not elaborate.96
Certainly, the terrain of the pocket
and the worsening autumn weather
had presented challenges to CB work,
especially during the final phase. But
Ross had extolled the effectiveness
of sound ranging throughout the
operation. Sound ranging undeniably
had advantages over flash spotting
and aerial photography because it
was less affected by poor visibility
caused by the weather.
However, 2nd CBO Staff’s
intelligence summaries are slightly
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A prepared, but unoccupied, German gun position
outside the village of Retranchement was identified
on Canadian defence overprint maps as early as 10
September 1944. The position was considered active
on the eve of Operation Switchback and targeted by the
predicted fire of 10 troops of 5.5-inch and 7.2-inch guns
which fired 112 rounds at the target. An operational
research report later determined that only 11 shells
fell near the German battery. Aerial reconnaissance
photos taken on 21 October show the position (above
and closeup right). The large craters which straddle the
position were left by an attack by medium bombers. The
smaller craters left by the artillery are more difficult to
discern on the air photo.

Left: This figure shows a plot of the artillery shells
directed at the German battery. It was found that the
mean point of impact (MPI) was 102 yards past and 78
yards to the right of the target. Only 11 shells of 112
fired fell with a 100 yard box centred on the target.
Report No.24, “Accuracy of Predicted Shooting,” in Terry Copp,
ed., Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest
Europe, 1944–1945 (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS, 2000), pp.311-23.
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misleading with respect to the value
of sound ranging. A careful statistical
analysis of the hostile battery lists and
CB intelligence summaries indicates
that although sound ranging was the
most frequently successful method of
identifying active German batteries,
by itself it rarely provided enough
information to fix a battery. Of
197 fixed batteries listed in the
counter-battery documents from 5
October to 4 November, 74.6 percent
appeared as “fixed” for the first time
as a result of aerial photography, not
sound ranging. A further 2.5 percent
were fixed by AOP. Sound ranging
accounted for only 5.1 percent of
batteries listed as “fixed” for the
first time.97 In other words, while
sound ranging could identify and
roughly locate a hostile battery,
aerial photography was required in
order to gain enough information
about it before it could be engaged.
Conversely, aerial photography
could only be used when the weather
permitted. Therefore, in the Breskens
Pocket, no single counter-battery
technique could pinpoint hostile
batteries by itself.
How accurate was the Canadian
CB fire during the battle? One method
was through operational research
which had already revealed some
very important lessons about artillery
by the time of Switchback. There
were already some serious doubts
in 1944 as to the accuracy of artillery
fire. The 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA
participated in a simulation in April
1944 to test methods of measuring
the accuracy of artillery fire and
determine the causes of inaccuracies.
The experiment involved firing on
three dummy targets, codenamed
Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, and
measuring the discrepancies between
each shell crater and the targets. The
study produced some interesting
results. The mean point of impact
of the 48 rounds fired at Jupiter was
one degree 33 minutes to the right
and 27 yards long of the target.
Similarly, the mean point of impact
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3

for the bombardment on Saturn
was 36 minutes to the right and
228 yards short of the target. Only
one dummy gun at Saturn was hit
in the entire experiment, and that
hit was by a single shell fragment.
In other words, on average, shells
not only missed Jupiter and Saturn,
they did so by a wide margin in both
bearing and range. Worst of all, an
error at the command post meant
that a quarter of the rounds directed
at Mars landed over 1,000 yards
past the target. Unfortunately, the
report was not completed until after
the Battle of the Scheldt. The study
yielded no general conclusions as it
was meant to be supplemented by
future experiments.98 Nevertheless, it
showed that the slightest errors could
produce wildly inaccurate results in
a bombardment.
By autumn 1944, concentrations
were getting larger and units were
using ammunition from different
production lots as well as uncalibrated
guns, and it was suspected that
predicted shooting was inaccurate.
The question of accuracy was crucial.
No.2 Operational Research Section
(ORS) could do little work in autumn
of 1944, in part because the fighting
was a continuous struggle with few
large set-piece battles. However,
Major J.G. Wallace, one of the artillery
experts in No.2 ORS, did manage to
conduct an important examination of
the accuracy of predicted fire in which
he focused on CB fire. There were few
suitable battlefields on which to base
the study. The Breskens Pocket was
the logical choice because “little if any
firing had taken place beforehand,
and where the distribution of shells
could be examined soon after firing,
without any danger of its being
confused by subsequent fighting.”99
The inherent problem with
counter-bombardment was
ascertaining its effectiveness while
a battle was still in progress. If an
enemy battery ceased to fire, was
it because friendly artillery had
successfully destroyed it, or had

the enemy simply moved its guns
to another location? Or had the
battery run out of shells? Visual
confirmation that a hostile battery
had been destroyed was often needed
to consider it permanently silenced.
Thus, operational research conducted
after a battle was the only way to
assess the effectiveness of counterbombardment.
Wallace’s examination of the
accuracy of CB fire in the Breskens
Pocket was nothing short of
groundbreaking. No.2 ORS examined
aerial photographs of five hostile
batteries engaged on 6 October.
Hostile battery history sheets
confirmed that the pre-zero counterbombardment programme was the
first time each of these batteries
had been fired upon. They had
not been engaged again between
H-Hour and the time at which the
photographs were taken or affected
by the engagement of any other
battery.100 The study found that shells
had fallen over a large area, typically
1,000 yards square. Only about 4.4
percent of shells landed within 100
yards square of the target, meaning it
would take over 2,000 shots to cause
100 of them to fall into an area of
100 yards square. Wallace attributed
this dispersion to errors in sight
testing and command post work.
Meteorological work, survey and
calibration only accounted for minor
errors in the fall of shot.101
A report compiled after the war,
using data from Operations Wellhit
(Boulogne), Switchback and Veritable
(Rhineland), confirmed Wallace’s
conclusions. Only 5 percent of shells
could be expected to land within
100 yards square of a hostile battery.
Though CB fire could still have a
neutralizing effect on the enemy,
even a heavy bombardment could
produce only temporary results.102
Operational research seriously
challenged the Allies’ perception
of the accuracy of artillery, not just
during Switchback, but predicted fire
in general. Either more shells would
31
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be required or measures would have
to be taken to improve the accuracy of
each shell in future operations.
In the end, the inaccuracy
of artillery compromised the
effectiveness of counter-bombardment
during Operation Switchback.
Artillery fire undoubtedly hurt the
Germans’ morale and impeded
their movements, but certainly the
experience in the Breskens Pocket
showed that it was too inaccurate
to destroy a hostile battery or
neutralize it for very long. Despite
the disappointing performance of
artillery in terms of accuracy during
the battle, operational research
helped commanders understand
why errors were so prevalent and
gave clues as to how they could be
remedied. Operational research alone
could not achieve victory: it was up
to gifted field commanders to use its
lessons to the Allies’ advantage to
bring a speedy and welcome end to
the Second World War.

Conclusion

P

rior to Operation Switchback,
the Canadians had little
intelligence concerning German
strength, dispositions or locations of
hostile batteries beyond the forward
defences. This was a serious handicap
for counter-battery efforts. Because
the German batteries were relatively
silent before the battle, the Canadians
had only fixed a small number. Once
the battle was underway, the CB
organization had to contend with
poor visibility from the worsening
autumn weather, a lengthy period
of German inactivity and the lack of
natural observation posts on the flat
terrain.
The battle exemplified the
weaknesses of specific counterbattery techniques. Careful analysis
shows that sound ranging was not
precise enough to accurately locate
German guns. Regardless of how well
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sound ranging worked in identifying
an active German battery, aerial
photography was almost always
needed to engage it. Unfortunately,
photo-reconnaissance aircraft could
only operate in good weather and
sound ranging was most effective
in clear, calm weather. Yet in the all
too rare occurrences of favourable
conditions, the two methods
produced invaluable information on
the location, size and behaviour of
German batteries. That the Canadians
had known so little about the German
reserves and coastal positions before
the battle made the success of CB
work an even greater achievement.
In the end, the Allied counter-battery
methods proved to be invaluable
during Switchback.
As Major Wallace discovered in
his study of the battlefield, counterbombardment by predicted shooting
suffered from severe limitations.
The primary culprits for the wide
dispersion of shells were errors at the
command post and in sight testing,
not calibration or meteorology.
Survey mistakes were responsible
only for marginal errors. Given the
limitations of CB work during quiet
periods and in poor weather, as
well as the inaccuracy of predicted
shooting, artillery accounted for a
less substantial role in the Canadian
victory at the Scheldt than historians
have previously realized.
The Canadian struggle for
the Breskens Pocket was not an
exercise in “brute force.” Despite
the large number of artillery units
devoted to Switchback, planners
had never meant to use artillery
as a “blunt instrument.” Instead,
artillery was employed as flexibly
as possible for attacks on precise
targets. The diligence of LieutenantColonel J.H.D. Ross and 2nd Survey
Regiment, RCA shows that the Allies
used highly developed methods to
enable the artillery to silence German
guns with the most intelligent and

economical application of firepower.
Such methods do not resemble the
clumsy tactics presented in John Ellis’
“brute force” thesis.
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